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COMMENTS
EXPANDING THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER IN
POLLUTION CONTROL: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
While the rapid deterioration of the environment is a
commonly reiterated fact of contemporary American life,
reactions to this problem run the gamut from indifference to
intrepidation. Since the fight against pollution has come into
vogue, a flurry of action has taken place to save our environment
from impending disaster. Many of these efforts, however, have
not been as effective as the exigencies of the situation warrant.
This ostensible paradox has many sources at the federal level:
the congressional committee system, based on seniority and domi-
nated by a handful of powerful and firmly entrenched congress-
men and senators, is a formidable obstacle to environmental re-
form; dozens of federal agencies develop independent policies
toward the environment and often work at cross purposes;1 and
the enforcement procedures provided by much of the recent
federal pollution legislation is thoroughly cumbersome. Gen-
erally, there is no centralized, integrated system of environmental
control at the state level either. Authority and policy making
functions are spread among such diverse agencies as public health
departments, state land boards, fish and game departments, and
agricultural divisions.3 At the local level the difficulties of juris-
dictional limitations, state preemption, and proprietary political
interests make it burdensome, if not impossible, to synchronize
a single pollution policy among several localities. This predica-
ment becomes increasingly severe where the source and effects of
the pollutants extend beyond the borders of many political sub-
divisions.
1. Reitze, Pollution Control: Why has it Failed?, 55 A.B.AJ. 923, 926 (1969).
2. Some progress towards coordination, although not necessarily effectiveness, has
been recently made in New York State with the passage of the Environmental Conser-
vation Law which vests a single department with authority to formulate state-wide
environmental policy. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERV. LAW (McKinney 1970).
3. Hansen, Creating New Institutional Arrangements for Environmental Quality
Control, 3 NATURAL RasouacEs LAw. 739, 751 (1970).
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A. Scope of this Comment
The structure and legal powers of local government may not
always be a handicap in matters of ecological concern. The close-
ness of the local legislators to their constituents and the absence
of the need to coordinate the policies and interests of different
governmental units may enable the local government, in some
situations, to recognize and respond more quickly to pressing
environmental crises.
It is posited that local government may be an effective
mode through which current ecological problems can be solved.
The greater flexibility and responsiveness of local government
enables it to apply a pragmatic approach to the abatement of
pollution where the higher levels of government have failed.
The question remains, however, as to whether local governments
are equipped with the constitutional and statutory powers re-
quired to correct today's environmental abuses. Of assistance in
undertaking this inquiry is an analysis of a recent local law which
controls the phosphate contamination of water supplies.4
B. An Example of the Pragmatic Use of Local Police Power
Suffolk County, New York, a rapidly urbanizing county on
Long Island, depends entirely upon ground water as its source
of potable water.5 There are no sewers in the county and homes
and businesses are serviced by cesspools and septic tanks.0 As
a result of these circumstances, sewage effluents permeate the
aquifiers7 and mingle with the ground waters." This dilemma
is coupled with the presence of phosphate detergents in these
effluents. The deleterious effects of phosphate on water are rec-
ognized as a potentially dangerous condition to the health and
4. Suffolk County, New York, Resolution No. 962 (1970).
5. DETERGENTS AND ASSOCIATED CONTAMINANTS IN GROUNDWATER AT THREE PUBLIC
SUPPLY WELL FIELDS IN SOUTHWESTERN SUFFOLK COUNTY LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK, Geologi-
cal Survey Water Supply Paper 2001-B at 1 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as WATER
SUPPLY PAPER].
6. Id.
7. An aquifier is defined as "[a] geological formation which holds groundwater,
or more accurately, through which groundwater moves .... " Widman, Ground Water-
Hydrology and the Problem of Competing Well Owners, 14 ROcKY MT. MINERAL L.
INST. 523, 525 (1968).
8. WATER SUPPLY PAPER at 3.
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welfare of the inhabitants.9 Such a condition existed through-
out virtually all of the upper aquifier in an area studied in
Suffolk County.10 Faced with this growing hazard, the Suffolk
County Legislature decided to take the initiative and devise a pre-
vention and cure to this threat.
The County Legislature realized that until an adequate (and
tremendously costly) system of public sewers was developed in
the county, the only feasible method of preventing the contam-
ination of ground water by phosphate detergents was to render
them unavailable to consumers in the county. To accomplish this,
a new law bans the sale, exchange or disposal to another of any
detergent containing prohibited substances.1 ' The local law
provides three remedies for non-compliance: (1) a fine of up to
$250 and/or imprisonment for up to 15 days;'2 (2) a civil pen-
alty of $50 for each infraction; 3 and (3) an action brought
by the county to compel compliance and restrain violation.14
If the law is strictly enforced and adhered to, (assuming that the
greatest portion of all phosphate detergents used in Suffolk Coun-
ty are purchased within its borders) the amount of phosphates
entering the ground water from septic tanks would be greatly re-
duced.
II. CRITERIA FOR THE EXERCISE OF MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER
The postulation that municipal police power is a means of
controlling contemporary ecological problems, as was demonstrat-
ed in Suffolk County, must be prefaced with a discussion of the
powers and constraints of municipal legislation. Since the afore-
mentioned example was a Suffolk County, New York law, the
treatment of local governmental autonomy will focus on that
state. To facilitate discussion, a sketch of the constitutional grant
will first be set forth.
9. See generally Phosphates in Detergents and the Eutrophication of America's
Waters, Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Conservation and Natural Resources of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
10. WATER SUPPLY PAPER at 21.
11. Suffolk County, New York, Resolution No. 962 § 1 (1970).
12. Id. §6.




In the past, local legislative power in New York State has
been restricted to those areas within the ambit of property, affairs
or government. 15 Even within this narrow, and often vague, de-
finition, local governments were severely limited.' Surprisingly,
even the area of public health was held to be outside the realm
of local legislation because it was said not to be covered by prop-
erty, affairs or government, but was a matter primarily of state
concern.
17
With the passage of the present article IX of the New York
State Constitution in 1963, local governments, which include
towns, villages, counties and cities,18 have been given expanded and
more clearly defined powers of local legislation without an ini-
tial resort to the state legislature for special enabling legisla-
tion.' 9 The revised article IX directs that the powers granted to
municipalities shall be "liberally construed. '20 In so directing,
the legislature overruled the strict tenents of construction against
home rule powers that had been traditionally applied.21
Section 2 (c) (ii) of article IX states that local govern-
ments shall have the power to adopt all local laws not incon-
sistent with the constitution or any general laws "whether or not
they relate to property, affairs, or government. '22 In addition,
subdivision 10 of section 2 (c) empowers localities to pass such
laws where they relate to the "government, protection, order,
conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property
-"23 of the municipality. These powers, literally read, are
strikingly broad and implicitly, at least, abrogate the announce-
ment in Ainslee v. Lounsberry14 that public health is a matter
15. See Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929). See generally Rich-
land, Property Affairs and Government, Home Rule Handbook 18 New York State Office
for Local Government, Municipal Law Seminar 15 (1964).
16. See, e.g., County Securities, Inc. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 15 N.E.2d 179 (1938).
17. Ainslee v. Lounsberry, 275 App. Div. 729, 730, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (3d Dep't
1949).
18. N.Y. CoNsr. art. IX, § 3(d)(2).
19. Id. § 2(c).
20. Id. § 3(c).
21. See Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965: Retrospect and Prospect,
15 BUFFALo L. REv. 335, 354 (1965).
22. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(il).
23. Id. § 2(c)(10).
24. 275 App. Div. 729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (3d Dep't 1949).
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primarily of state concern. With this provision, the state has rel-
egated itself to a supervisory role.
To implement the revised home rule provisions of the state
constitution, the legislature enacted a revised Municipal Home
Rule Law in 1963.25 Under article II, section 10 of that law,
which took effect March 10, 1970, the legislature gives munici-
palities power to enact all laws for the "protection and enhance-
ment" of their "physical and visual environment"2 6 and the "pro-
tection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being"2 7 of their
inhabitants. Such broad enabling enouncements must dispel any
lingering doubts as to the legislative autonomy of the municipal-
ity in the area of local health and safety. Public health and safety,
of necessity, includes all facets of pollution whether they be a
threat to the "physical or visual environment."
While the municipality is empowered with a modicum of
legislative autonomy in matters of health and well-being of local
inhabitants, such power is confined by the doctrines of incon-
sistency with and preemption by the state constitution and gen-
eral laws.23 Also, local enactments must not run afoul of federal
powers and legislation.
B. Inconsistency and Preemption
As a condition to the exercise of local police power, the
New York State Constitution provides that all local laws must
be consistent with its provisions and those of any generally ap-
plicable statute.29 A state statute dealing with the same subject
as a local law may or may not preempt the entire field depending
upon its legislative purpose, and therefore laws dealing with
the same subject are not necessarily incompatible simply because
they are not identical.30 Indeed, "[a] municipality which is em-
powered to adopt health regulations may, in spite of general
regulations by the state, adopt additional regulations or require-
25. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAw (McKinney 1969).
26. Id. art. 2, § 10(1)(a)(11) (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
27. Id. § 10(l)(a)(12).
28. See Radlein, The Police Power, Home Rule Handbook 18 New York State Office
for Local Government, Municipal Law Seminar 27 (1964).
29. N.Y. CONsr. art. IX, § 2 (c).
30. People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 51, 64 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1945).
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ments where there is a real distinction between the municipality
and other parts of the state."'31
In a recent lower court case,32 it was held that a New York
City gun control law was constitutional despite the existence
of a state law that regulated the possession of rifles and shot-
guns by persons under the age of sixteen, aliens, convicted
felons, and adjudicated incompetents.33 In sustaining a city or-
dinance that further prohibited the possession of a rifle or a shot-
gun to any person unless that person first obtained a permit,
the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, stated
that the statute "does not treat so extensively with the subject
matter of the control of such weapons as to evince any design or
intention by the state to preempt the entire field."-4
A general statement that state laws in a particular field are
only meant as minimum standards would, however, be erroneous.
In Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade, Inc. v. City of New
York,35 the Court of Appeals struck down a city law that estab-
lished a minimum wage of $1.50 per hour where the parallel
state law provided for $1.25 per hour. One of the reasons given
for the decision was that the state legislature had evinced a pur-
pose to occupy the entire field. It appears that where a state
law does not explicitly preempt a field of legislation, the decision
must be based in part on the nature of the legislative purpose.
C. Reasonableness and Valid Local Objectives
Local laws must be directed to the achievement of a legiti-
mate public purpose, and must be designed to reasonably attain
valid local objectives; these criteria are essential for compliance
with due process. As the Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he
guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means sel-
ected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
31. S.H. Kress v. Department of Health, 283 N.Y. 55, 59, 27 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1940).
32. Grimm v. City of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 525, 289 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
33. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05 (McKinney 1967).
34. Grimm v. City of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 525, 528, 289 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
35. 12 N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E.2d 632, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128, aff'g 17 App. Div. 2d 327,
234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1962); see Comment, Home Rule: A Fresh Start, 14 BUFFALO
L. Rzv. 484, 489 n.37 (1965).
36. 17 App. Div. 2d at 330, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 865; cf. Hudson Valley Light weight
Aggregate Corp. v. Schovel, 64 Misc. 2d 814, 316 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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sought to. be attained. 3 7 The traditional view of the New York
Courts as to the limitations of local police power is illustrated by
Safee v. City of Buffalo8s where the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, held constitutional a Buffalo city ordinance
that prohibited soft drink dealers from operating between mid-
night and six A.M. The court restated the two tests that were to
be applied to the exercise of local police powers: "Is there a real
evil, reasonably to be anticipated and to be guarded against? Is
there a real relation between the evil and the proposed remedy?"' 9
In applying these standards at the time of the Safee decision,
the burden of proof and the presumption favoring the exercise
of such powers differed with regard to whether the local law
was exercised pursuant to a specific grant by the state, or whether
it was enacted under the aegis of general authority. Where the
ordinance was enacted in pursuance of general authority, it may
have been opposed as unreasonable, and evidence may have'been
introduced on the question; where it was enacted under specific
authority of the legislature, the contrary was true.40 The opera-
tion of this standard was construed in light of the rule that "[a]ny
fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the [municipality], and
the power is denied.' 1 Today, this strict standard has been said
not to apply where the power is given directly to the munici-
pality,40 Where the nature of the power is direct, an ordinance
that seeks to protect the health, safety or welfare of local
inhabitants will not be invalidated unless found to be essenti-
ally arbitrary.4 By virtue of this present lenient standard of re-
view, and the constitutional admonition that powers granted
to local governments shall be liberally construed,44 a local law
passed under the direct grant of section 2 (c) of the New York
State Constitution will be upheld unless found to be arbitrary.
37. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
38. 204 App. Div. 561, 198 N.Y.S. 646 (4th Dep't 1923).
39. Id. at 563, 198 N.Y.S. at 649.
40. Id.
41. 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237
(5th ed. 1911).
42. Hyman, supra note 21, at 354.
43. See Stracquadanio v. Department of Health, 285 N.Y. 93, 97, 32 N.E.2d 806,
808 (1941). But see People's Dairy v. City of Lackawanna, I Misc. 2d 700, 703, 149 N.Y.S.2d
392, 396 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
44. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (c).
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This gives the municipality great discretion in fashioning methods
to protect the environment.
D. Conflict with Federal Powers and Legislation
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,4 a city
smoke abatement law was held constitutional even as applied
against steam vessels operating within interstate commerce. In
an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart (Douglas and Frank-
furter, JJ., dissenting), the Court held that the promotion of the
health or welfare of the public in this field by a state or its instru-
mentalities may be exercised concurrently with the federal com-
merce power.4 Concurrent power is authorized provided that
the local law is neither arbitrary nor unduly burdensome upon
interstate commerce.4 7
Preemption by federal statute must also be considered. Such
preemption will not be inferred merely because the federal
government has provided for limited regulation in a given field
occupied by the local regulation. 8 Hence, in a recent New York
case, a town ordinance prohibiting seaplanes from taking off
or landing upon any portion of the town's channel system was
held constitutional.49 The court's rationale was that federal
legislation preempts a field only where the "scheme of federal
legislation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it."6 0 Pre-
emption may not exist, for example, where a municipality
controls pollution concurrently with a federal water pollution
statute." Indeed, absence of preemption is manifested by the
45. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
46. Id. at 442; see People v. Carbone, 54 Misc. 2d 762, 765, 283 N.Y.S.2d 468,
471-72 (New York City Crim. Ct. 1967).
47. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). "Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on Inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 874 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1963);
Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Canton Poultry,
Inc. v. Conner, 278 F. Supp. 822, 825 (N.D. Fla. 1968); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Kandle, 105 N.J. Super. 104, 251 A.2d 295 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (smoke abate-
ment statute).
48. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
49. People v. Altman, 61 Misc. 2d 4, 304 N.YS.2,d 534 (Nassau County Ct. 1969).
50. Id. at 5, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
51. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466 (b) (c) (Stipp.
V, 1970).
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legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.52
The House Report accompanying the 1961 amendments to the
act states that: "There certainly can be no assumption that the
Federal interests in the field of water pollution abatement autho-
rized by this bill are so dominant as to preclude State action. The
proposition is well established that the protection of the health
and welfare of citizens of a State is a proper subject for the
exercise of the State police power."5 3 Since the New York
State Legislature has delegated these powers to local government,
a municipality may deal with local pollution problems and do so
where a federal pollution statute has not explicitly precluded
state and local authority.
III. MEETING THE CRITERIA-DOES THE LAWS PASS
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER?
In enacting their ordinance, the Suffolk County Legislature
relied upon article IX, section 2 (c) (10) of the New York State
Constitution as the source of enabling power. 4 To determine
the constitutionality of the ordinace, it must be measured against
the various criteria for the exercise of local police power ad-
vanced above.
Section 2 (c) (10) broadly provides that a local government
may pass all laws not inconsistent with the constitution or
any general state laws, whether or not they relate to property,
affairs, or government for the "government, protection, order,
conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property. 55
These powers are to be liberally construed;56 and the ability
to pass such laws is extended to counties, cities, towns or vil-
lages.57 Given the gravity of the ground water situation in
Suffolk County, a law that seeks to alleviate it comes within the
purview of "health and well-being" of inhabitants.
Nothing contained in the ordinance appears to be in conflict
with state constitutional provisions, but the measure must also
52. 75 Stat. 204 (1961), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq. (Supp. V. 1970).
53. H.R. REP. No. 306, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
54. Letter from Suffolk County Attorney's office to the author, January 4, 1971.
55. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (c) (10).
56. Id. § 3 (c); see Kroleck v. Lowery, 32 App. Div. 2d 317, 322, 302 N.Y.S.2d
109, 114 (1st Dep't 1969).
57. N.Y. MUN. HosaF RuLE LAW art. 2, § 10 (1) (ii) (a) (McKinney 1969).
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be consistent with all general laws of the state. The Environ-
mental Conservation Law58 sets forth the policy of the state con-
cerning pollution-the posture of which is one of coordination and
cooperation rather than preemption of local governmental en-
tities. Under section 77 of that same statute, certain powers of
the State Health and Conservation Departments relating to
pollution are transferred to the newly created Department of
Environmental ConservationY9 The Department is therefore
vested with the power to enforce the remedies against pollution
created under the Public Health Law. 0 The Public Health
Law, in turn, provides that it is the purpose of its article 12 to pro-
vide cumulative remedies to abate water pollution and not to
abridge or alter the remedies presently existing, "nor shall any
provision ... be construed as estopping the state, persons or
municipalities . . . in the exercise of their rights to suppress
nuisances or to abate pollution .... -"1 Also, while the existing
condition in the public supply wells of Suffolk County appears to
have been in violation of the water quality standards promulgated
pursuant to the Public Health Law, 2 due to the particular source
of the pollutants, these statutory remedies were inadequate. 3
There also existed a general state statute on the regulation
of phosphate detergents. The law, former section 391-c of the
General Business Law,0 merely required that soaps and de-
tergents be plainly labeled with their phosphate content. The
law's efficacy was premised on the assumption that ecologically-
minded consumers would not purchase detergents with a high
58. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERV. LAW (McKinney 1970).
59. Id. § 77.
60. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. XII (McKinney 1971).
61. Id. § 1260 (emphasis added).
62. See Id. § 1205 (8). The standards applicable to fresh groundwaters used as
a source of potable water supply call for a level of nitrate not to exceed 20.0 milligrams
per liter of groundwater, and levels of alkybenzenesulfonate (ABS-a component of
laundry detergents) not to exceed 1.5 milligrams per liter of groundwater. 6 OFFICIAL
COMPILATION, CODE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 703,4 (1968).
However, the levels of both nitrate and ABS present in the groundwater supply, at
times, exceeded these statutory limits. WATER SUPPLY PAPER, supra note 5, at 13. There-
fore, a violation existed for which a potential remedy was available. See, e.g., N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1101-03, 1210, 1250-52, 1254-55 (McKinney 1971).
63. While there existed civil and criminal penalties for violation of the potable
water standards, a suit to enjoin the sources of the pollutants (privately owned washing
machines) would not be practical to enforce against thousands of potential, individual
offenders.
64. [1970] N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 991.
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phosphate content, thus alleviating this as a source of water
pollution. The control that this law offered was recognized as in-
adequate to relieve the near crisis situation existing in Suffolk
County. The county law went far beyond the state statute in pro-
hibiting the sale of such detergents entirely, 5 and in doing so
raises the issue of whether a municipality may bar that which a
state law permits. The answer lies in a "special conditions" doc-
trine announced by the courts. That is, a municipality may adopt
higher standards where they are based upon special conditions
existing in the locale.66 Because the state's relatively permissive-
anti-detergent law recognized the dangers of phosphates, while
manifesting no intention to cover the entire field, and there clear-
ly existed in Suffolk County special conditions upon which stricter
standards could be sustained, the law was not inconsistent with
section 391-c of the General Business Law. In light of the above
discussion, the local law does not appear to have been either
inconsistent with or preempted by any general state law.
The local law is directed towards the achievement of a legiti-
mate public purpose-namely, the health of local inhabitants.
The method devised to attain this objective seems reasonably
designed to do so, and does not appear to be arbitrary.67 Fur-
thermore, the classification adopted between phosphate and
phosphate-free detergents is reasonable in view of the scientific
evidence available as to the detrimental effects of phosphates on
water.68 Since the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power
and promotes the general welfare of the community, it may not
be disturbed on state grounds. 9
65. Suffolk County, New York, Resolution No. 962, § 3 (1971). In the last moments
of the 1971 session of the New York State Legislature, a law was passed that mandates
the phasing out of phosphate detergents by June 1, 1973. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 716.
66. See, e.g., S.H. Kress v. Department of Health, 283 N.Y. 55, 27 N.E.2d 431 (1940).
But see Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969).
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, POLLUTION
OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE
RIVER 81-82 (1970).
69. If challenged, the person asserting the law's invalidity must bear the burden
of overcoming the presumption favoring the constitutionality of municipal enactments.
See Wigins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 218-19, 149 N.E.2d 869, 871, 173 N.Y.S.2d
579, 581-82 (1958); Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 540-41,
132 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1956); Van Curler Develop. Corp. v. Schenectady, 59 Misc. 2d
621, 626, 300 N.Y.S.2d 765, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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Determinative federal objections to this ordinance are sim-
ilarly nonexistent. It does not unduly burden interstate commerce
given the seriousness of the local interest involved. Moreover,
there is a lack of any conflicting federal pollution statute, since
the federal water pollution laws deal only with the abatement
of pollution in interstate or navigable waters.70 The intrastate
and subterranean character of the water involved here is there-
fore outside the circumscription of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. Thus, the local law, having met all the requirements
of legitimacy, is a valid exercise of municipal police power in
New York State.
To merely demonstrate that local efforts may provide
a cure for pollution is not enough; for admittedly, federal and
state governments, with greater financial resources and pervasive
enabling authority, could be more effective in alleviating cer-
tain classes of pollution. The difficulty is that effective federal
and state legislation and enforcement are not readily forthcoming.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION IN POLLUTION
CONTROL
While normally a federal law may preempt that of any state
or locality,7' the federal pollution statutes clearly cast the pri-
mary responsibility for cleaning up the environment upon the
states. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit2 is a
judicial recognition of both the importance of the air pollution
crisis and the leeway that the federal government intends to ac-
cord local legislative solutions to local ecological difficulties.
Congress and the federal courts, of course, have the power
to take jurisdiction over social problems such as pollution.78 In
70. 33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
71. See e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (provisions of the Georgia
Tobacco Identification Act barred by 1935 Federal Tobacco Inspection Act); Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (conviction for sedition against the United States
under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act barred by the Smith Act and other federal laws);
Chicago v. Atchenson, T. & S.F.R.R., 357 U.S. 77 (1956) (federal law precluded Chicago
from deciding, by a licensing requirement, whether a transfer company could provide
motor vehicle service for the transfer of interstate passengers between Chicago railroads
and terminals).
72. 362 US. 440 (1960) ; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970), holding, inter alia,
that destruction of fish in estuarine waters has a substantial effect on commerce and,
therefore, Congress has the power to legislate in the area.
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United States v. Bishop Processing Co.,74 a federal district
court held, inter alia, that it was not divested of jurisdiction
under the Clean Air Act when an air pollution abatement suit
was commenced a year later in a state court by state agencies.
The decision on the merits in Bishop was bottomed on the
commerce power-the court finding that an economic relation-
ship existed between the Clean Air Act's regulation of business
and the protection of commerce. The rationale was that air pol-
lution has a deleterious effect on business, decreases property
values, and therefore has a detrimental effect on interstate com-
merce.7 5 The reasoning indicates that the federal government has
the ability to reach even the most local of pollution problems
where there is at least some tangential effect on interstate com-
merce.76 With this expansive power at Congress' disposal, however,
it has either been unable to produce a piece of legislation com-
mensurate with the crisis, or has been needlessly delayed through
the protracted process of congressional compromise.
A. Failure of Congressional Action
An often mentioned justification for Congress' wait-and-see
attitude toward pollution legislation is that Congress does not
wish to act on admittedly incomplete information. While Con-
gress is waiting for conclusive scientific information upon which
to act, an adversarial atmosphere evolves in which the far-
sighted advocates of environmental reform are opposed by the
immediate demands of labor, shareholders, and the American de-
sire to increase the gross national product. The purpose of this
contest is to persuade a vacilating Congress, as the impartial ar-
biter of the issue, that based upon available evidence, it should or
should not take immediate remedial measures. Almost invariably,
the presumption favors inaction, since Congress has little realistic
74. 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 904 (1970).
75. 287 F. Supp. at 630-31, citing Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1959).
The "commerce power may be exercised to achieve socially desirable objectives, even in
the absence of economic considerations." Id. at 630.
76. Cf. recent cases enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See also notes 121-31, infra and accom-
panying text.
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choice but to give the advice of industry more than its due de-
ference.7
1. Delay and compromise. A graphic example of the con-
gressional aptitude for compromise in ecological matters is pre-
sent in the closely related area of conservation. For example, the
passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964,78 was a slow and agonizing
process spread over many years. The bill, vehemently opposed by
interests from the lumber, mining, power and irrigation indus-
tries, was originally introduced in the United States Senate
in 1956.71 From that date until the passage of a watered down
version of the bill in 1964, eighteen hearings were held, sixty-
five bills were introduced, and thousands of pages of transcript
were compiled.80 Opponents of the bill relied upon Representa-
tive Wayne Aspinall of Colorado to secure the weakest measure
possible. As Chairman of the key House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, his past record consistently favored industrial
interests, particularly where they clashed with those of conserv-
ationists.8' Aspinall refused to report the bill out of committee
until his version received endorsement. In 1963 conservationists
acceded to Aspinall's demands, realizing that a compromise act
was better than none.82
A similar illustration of congressional ineptitude in environ-
mental areas was the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore affair.
The Dunes, a valuable scenic, scientific and recreational re-
source, stood in the way of the expansion plans of several giant
steel producers on the southern end of Lake Michigan.8 Com-
mencing in 1958, legislation that sought to preserve the area as a
national lakeshore was introduced in each session of Congress. 4
In 1963 steel producers succeeded in their attempt to expand onto
the priceless dunes at the expense of one of the most scenic sec-
tions- of the lakeshore. 5 Much of the blame for the loss can be
77. Lack of Congressional expertise in the technologies of pollution control com-
pels Congress to rely upon the biased advice of those whose interests it must regulate.
78. 16 US.C. §§ 1131-36 (1964).
79. Mercure & Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of Congressional Compromise,
in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (R. Cooley SL G. Wandesforde-Smith eds. 1970).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Id. at 58-59.
83. Kyle, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore: The Battle for the Dunes, in CON-
GRES s AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17 (R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-Smith cds. 1970).
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 20.
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attached to congressional inaction. It was not until 1966 that the
Indiana Dunes Bill was reported out of the House Interior Com-
mittee;86 too late to save the Dunes in their undespoiled splen-
dour, the compromise produced a national lakeshore bisected
by a steel complex.
2. Cumbersome enforcement procedures. Where Congress
acts at all, the procedure provided for enforcement of the rem-
edies created is almost deliberately cumbersome, as in the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act. With respect to water
pollution, the effects of which are limited to the state in which the
discharges originate, the act provides that federal action may be
taken only at the request of a state's governor, a state pollution
control agency, or a municipality with the approval of both the
governor and the state water pollution control agency.88 The re-
sult of such a request is the convening of a "conference" which
initiates the enforcement mechanism. The conference involves
public hearings with participating pollution control agencies,,9
followed by notice specifying a period in which remedial action
must be taken 0 and, eventually, provisions for judicial enforce-
ment if "action reasonably calculated to secure abatement of the
pollution within the time specified in the notice'. . . is . . . not
taken .... -91 At a time when water contamination is threatening
the continued existence of the human race, such procedural safe-
guards granted to polluters are indefensible.
Enforcement difficulties also existed in the Federal Clean
Air Act prior to its 1970 amendments,2 where lack of legal muscle
led to only one abatement suit pursuant to the actY3 In the
wake of an air pollution dilemma that has been increasing for
years, Congress in 1970 finally passed a law that, if zealously en-
forced, could begin to vitiate the air contamination crisis.94 The
86. Id. at 21. Pub. L. No. 89-761, 80 Stat. 1309 (1966), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460
(Supp. IV, 1969).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq. (Supp. V. 1970).
88. Id. § 466g(d).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 466g(e).
91. Id. § 466g(g).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq.
(Supp. May, 1971).
93. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd,
423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
94. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 1705 (1970),
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. May, 1971).
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amended act shifts to the Administrator of the newly created En-
vironmental Protection Agency the initiative in the pollution
abatement process; although ultimate enforcement is still recog-
nized as primarily the responsibility of the states involved. Under
the act, the Administrator formulates and publishes: (1) primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards; 5 (2) pollution
sources that must comply with the standards formulated;" and (3)
emission standards for hazardous pollutants for which national am-
bient air quality standards have been designed. 7 For violation of
these standards, the Administrator himself may issue or-
ders of compliance and commence civil action to force obe-
dience." The burden of formulating plans to meet the criteria
set by the Administrator rests upon the states. As with the plan
to meet primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, the
states have nine months to submit an acceptable implementation
plan99 with up to an eighteen month extension.100 The plan
must be designed to achieve the standards within three years; 10 1
however, an extension not to exceed two years is available.10 2 If,
in the end, the state fails to produce an acceptable plan, the
Administrator is empowered to impose his own plan on the state
for implementation. 10 3
If the amended act is vigorously enforced, has adequate finan-
cial and manpower backing, and obtains the vital cooperation from
state and municipal governments without the interference of pol-
itically motivated obstacles, it may achieve what has eluded
federal efforts up to now. However, while there has been activity
under the law in the way of formulation of standards to be
met,1 4 it remains to be seen if the law can overcome the prob-
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-4 (Supp. May, 1971).
96. Id. § 1857c-6.
97. Id. § 1857c-7.
98. Id. § 1857c-8.
99. Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (1).
100. Id. § 1857c-5 (b).
101. Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A) (i).
102. Id. § 1857c-5 (e).
103. Id. § 1857c-5 (c).
104. See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1971) (publication of primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards for various pollutants); 36 Fed. Reg. 1515 (1971) (nitro.
gen oxide designated as a hazardous air pollutant, and air quality standards issued
for it); 36 Fed. Reg. 1486 (1971) (notice of proposed rule making with respect to the
lead content of gasoline); 36 Fed. Reg. 3825 (1971) (notice of proposed rule making
for the control of air pollution from new motor vehicles, and standards for exhaust
emissions) ; 36 Fed. Reg. 3528 (1971) (regulations issued for vehicle emission standards).
See generally 42 C.F.R. ch. IV (1971).
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lems that have historically plagued federal attempts to amelio-
rate pollution.1 5
3. Inaction on proposed reform legislation. In 1970 a
number of bills were introduced in Congress that would have
rendered enforcement of the federal water pollution laws a
less enigmatic procedure. S. 3471 sought to extend the juris-
diction of the Federal Water Quality Act to navigable intra-
state waters and groundwaters. 10 6 The bill would have also- em-
powered the Secretary to take action directly against individual
polluters without involving the state concerned; eliminated the
post enforcement conference hearing prior to court action; and
given the Secretary power to go directly to court for injunctive
relief without the need for either an enforcement conference or
a 180 day delay period as provided under the current law.10 7 S. 3687
would have authorized fines and penalties of $25,000-50,000 per
daily violation of an order of the Secretary, after a compliance
period has elapsed; eliminated enforcement hearings; and elimin-
ated mandatory enforcement conferences. 0 8 However, no action
has yet been taken on either of these measures'109
Where Congress has ample information upon which to act,
the tides of political fortune may preclude it from acting in a
publicly responsive manner. In the area of phosphate pollution,
a recent House Report,"0 based on voluminous scientific evidence,
emphatically urged that the manufacture and importation of de-
tergents containing phosphorous in any quantity should cease by
1972;1" manufacturers of detergents should promptly begin sub-
stantial reductions of the phosphate content in their products; 12
and phosphate (enzyme) pre-soaks should be removed from the
market."13 The report gave rise to H.R. 12435, introduced on
105. It has been reported that, in at least one region, failure to meet deadlines
set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is far more common than compliance.
Also, the EPA has not as yet achieved the administrative coordination that underlies
its purpose. Buffalo Evening News, July 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1 (city ed.).
106. Riley, Report of Comm. on Legal Problems of Sewage Disposal, 34A NIMLO
NAT'L MUN. L. REv. 250, 258 (1971).
107. Id. at 259.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 257.
110. H.R. RPa. No. 1004, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
111. Id. at 65.
112. Id. at 66.
113. Id.
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June 25, 1969, which would have banned the importation and
manufacture of such substances in the United States after June 1,
1971. At the close of the first session of the 91st Congress, however,
the bill was still pending with no action on it scheduled.1 1 4
4. The Refuse Act-1899 remedy for 1971 problems. Per-
haps most discouraging commentary on the current federal pol-
lution effort is the use of the recently reactivated Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899."' While the act is proving to be a potentially
efficacious tool, the 72 year old law was premised on maintaining
the navigability of interstate waters. As a matter of fortuity for
the ecologically concerned, section 13 of the act controls the dis-
charge of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets or sewers and passing there-
from in a liquid state" 1 6 into any navigable water. The Supreme
Court has held that the act's proscription includes municipal
wastes"* and petroleum products.'
The law, however, appears to be too effective for the present
administration due to the fact that under its qui tam feature,
multiple, separate violations of the act in cases of continuing dis-
charges could produce a substantial penalty to polluters and
turn pollution searching into a profitable adventure. In response
to this, the Department of Justice on June 15, 1970, attempted to
clarify to United States Attorneys the limits of enforcement of the
law." 9 The announced guidelines advised not to commence suit
114. During 1970, no less than seven bills were introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives calling for the prohibition of phosphate detergents. H. 17,608; H. 17,778;
H. 18,336; H. 18,840; H. 19,383; H. 19,864; H. 19,999. At the close of the 1970 session,
however, no action had been taken on any of these proposals. This pattern is repeating
itself in the 92nd Congress as well.
115. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1964). The law has been used in the past by
the Army Corps of Engineers to require industry to dredge where shipping channels
have become unnavigable due to the accumulation of industrial wastes. See, e.g., United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
117. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
118. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
119. JusncE DEP'T, GuimELINES FOR LITIGATION UNDER THE REFUSE Acr (June 15, 1970).
See generally STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 91sr CONG., 2d
SEss., Qui Tam ACTIONS AND THE 1899 RErUsE Acr: CrrIZMN LAwsurrs AGAINST POLLUTERS
OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print 1970).
According to a recent report, the effectiveness of the Refuse Act may be further
diluted by the difficulties of formulating and enforcing standards for innemerable and
diverse waterways. TIME, Aug. 2, 1971, at 47. This adds credence to the central theme
of this comment that localities may be better able to deal with their peculiar ecological
problems.
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without prior approval of the Department in cases of: (1) Civil
or criminal actions against continuous discharges from ordiiary
operations of a manufacturing plant (for which Congress created
the Federal Water Quality Administration); (2) Injunctive actions
against activities already subject to administrative proceedings
of the FWQA, and; (3) Criminal or civil action against a state,
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of a state,
or any person acting pursuant to a license from such state, county,
municipality or other political subdivision. 20 Whether the pur-
pose of this directive to limit the unrestrained use of the 1899 act
is viewed as an attempt to coordinate overall pollution policy or as
an effort to protect vested interests, it is clear that the 72 year
old act is too forceful for the government's present tread-lightly
approach to the amelioration of water pollution.
Nevertheless, to those concerned with the future of the envi-
ronment the law is a fortunate rediscovery. It cannot, however,
compensate for the loopholes in the present federal pollution
legislation. This legislation, on the whole, does not prevent the
actual manufacture of ecologically harmful substances. Rather,
the federal laws are aimed at ensuring that the process of manu-
facturing does not have ill-effects. In focusing on this aspect of
the total problem only, the federal laws ignore some most
harmful substances-the products of industry itself. Although
phosphates continue to destroy our lakes and estuaries and non-
returnable glass bottles and cans accumulate, creating severe solid
waste disposal problems, as long as industry abstains from pol-
luting the air and water in the manufacture of these products,
the federal laws are satisfied. This anomalous situation can
be rectified, in theory, by a bolder exercise of the national police
power, premised on the commerce clause.
B. Potential of the Federal Commerce Power to Curtail
Pollution
As stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby, 1 21
"Congress, following its own conception of public policy con-
cerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on
120. JusncE DEP'T, GumENs FOR LITIGATION UNDER THE REFusE Acr (June 15,
1970).
121. 312 US. 100 (1941).
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interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce ar-
ticles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare,
even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.1 22
Embodied in this opinion is the notion that the commerce power
encompasses the ability to prohibit items from interstate com-
merce for the achievement of some socially desirable objec-
tive 2-one of which is certainly the elimination of pollution.
Federal jurisdiction over intrastate air pollution is premised
upon the fact that pollution affects interstate commerce; that it
obstructs the navigable airspace;1 24 or that the movement of pol-
luted air is itself commerce. 12 5 Even where pollution appears
purely local in nature, "if it is interstate commerce that feels the
pinch it does not matter how local the operation which applies
the squeeze."'1 26 Since the contribution of individual polluters,
while itself insignificant, may still be proscribed because of its
cumulative effect, 27 potential harm to commerce is therefore
sufficient. Indeed, where the activities regulated appear to be
solely intrastate, but in the aggregate will probably affect com-
merce, the Supreme Court has stated that "it will certainly not
substitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of
the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are
clearly nonexistent.' 12
Despite this broad enabling power, Congress excuses its
lethargy over ecological reform legislation by professing a lack
of the scientific development necessary to abate contemporary
pollution problems-problems that will not await perfect knowl-
edge. Congress has also failed to exert its plenary power over
wholly intrastate water pollution on unnavigable waters, seek-
ing only to abate pollution in "interstate or navigable waters."' 20
122. Id. at 114.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) ; Electric Bond & Share
Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U.S. 419 (1938) ; Kentucky Whip 8: Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R.,
299 U.S. 334 (1937); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
124. Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce
Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1067, 1080-86
(1965).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md.
1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
126. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
127. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
128. Stafford v. -Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 466 (g) (b) (Supp. V, 1970).
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As limitations upon the power of Congress to regulate polluters,
lack of fully developed scientific evidence and wholly intrastate
waters are barriers more self-imposed than they are legal.
The pervasiveness of interstate commerce as an enabling
power to reach socially desirable ends is illustrated by Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United Statesa° where the Supreme Court
held constitutional, public accomodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to racial discrimination practiced
by a motel operating solely within the state. In upholding the
exercise of the plenary power of Congress based upon the com-
merce clause the Court stated, "'The power of Congress over in-
terstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end . . .•131
When the above discussion is read in conjunction with the
evidence proving the harmful effects that substances such as phos-
phate detergents and nonreturnable glass bottles and cans have
upon health and welfare, and the depressing effect intrastate
water pollution can have upon commerce, there remains little
realistic barrier to Congress' power over all polluters regardless of
their local nature. But as with the inaction on H.R. 12435, Con-
gress has been unable to reach a decision.
A politico-economic explanation for all this indecision is
obvious. To place sanctions upon the methods by which industry
produces its products is, while difficult to accept, bearable from
a profit-motive point of view. But the curtailment of the fruits
of industry itself becomes entirely unacceptable. Industry natur-
ally responds that such demands are unwarranted, reactionary,
and can only injure the nation. For the sake of national welfare,
therefore, industry must be given time to work out their problems
consistent with American laissez-faire capitalism. Industry is then
left to go about decreasing the damaging effects of their products
in a profit maximizing manner. As a course of action to save the
environment, this is patently ludicrous; and, as the traditional
approach of Congress to business, it must change if real reform is
to take place.
130. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
131. Id. at 258, quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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C. Failure of State Action
State pollution efforts are often guilty of the same short-
comings. In the area of phosphate control, as discussed earlier,
the New York State Legislature responded in 1970 with a law that
merely required that the manufacturer clearly indicate phosphate
content on the container.13 2 The governor's memorandum ac-
companying the law13 3 recognized the significant contribution that
phosphate detergents make toward water pollution. Apprised of
the nature of these chemicals and armed with the legislative power
to ban them, the legislature produced a law that was premised
on the theory that environmentally oriented consumers would
make the correct decision which should have been made by the
legislature in the first place. The naivet of the law's assumption
was clear and it is of little wonder that a mere two weeks after
its passage it was assailed as' grossly inadequate. 134
1. Broad enabling power is not enough. The approach of
the state pollution laws is similar to that of the federal-ignoring
the products themselves and merely mandating the way in which
they are manufactured. Yet, unlike federal regulation of some
aspects of pollution, where a requisite federal interest must be
demonstrated, state police power to ameliorate pollution for
the protection of the health and welfare of'inhabitants is a major
function of the state and its instrumentalities.
Despite broad language, 33 the New York Public Health Law
has some serious shortcomings substantively as well as procedur-
ally. For example, subdivision 5 of section 1230 excepts dis-
charges of sewage effluents from private dwellings of less than three
families from the proscription of the act and the requirement
of a permit. 86 With regard to the problem of the domestic use
of phosphate detergents, prior to the recently enacted state
detergent law,137 the only method of eliminating the problem
through the mechanisms of the Public Health Law would have
been to require municipalities to treat sewage in a manner elimi-
132. [1970] N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 991. The recently passed New York statute deal-
ing with detergents postpones final prohibition until June, 1973. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1971, ch. 716.
133. [1970] N.Y. Sess. Laws at 3138.
134. Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 9, 1971, at 4, col. 2 (city ed.).
135. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HaLRs LAw §§ 1202 (b), 1205, 1220 (McKinney 1971).
136. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1230 (5) (McKinney 1971).
137. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 716.
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nating the threat.13 The technology needed to remove such sub-
stances from sewage, however, has not yet been developed to
the point of economic feasibility. 3 9 It is therefore apparent
that article 12 of the Public Health Law cannot provide a
remedy for all sources of water pollution. These newly arising
sources, not contemplated by the drafters of the present pol-
lution law, require specific legislative initiative and action to be
solved-action that is not always readily forthcoming.
The enforcement procedures provided for in New York's law
seem too inflexible to deal with many ecological problems.
Section 1210 (8) empowers the commissioner to order the dis-
continuance of pollution of any waters of the state or cause pro-
ceedings to be brought to force compliance with the law.'40 Be-
fore the commissioner may issue an abatement order, however,
the law mandates that public hearings be held,' 41 preceded by
due notice. 42 Moreover, hearings are accorded to any person ag-
grieved by a determination of the commissioner prior to the ex-
ecution of the order. 4 3 It is, however, an established prin-
ciple of administrative law that where only property rights are
concerned, due process is satisfied if at some stage of the pro-
ceeding, an opportunity for a hearing and judicial determination
are made available. 144 This should be particularly true where
the legislative choice has already been made against pollution
and standards have been prescribed by administrative agencies.
In such a case, where the only issue might be whether the peti-
tioner has in fact violated pollution standards, inspection, exami-
nation and testing could be used as substitutes for hearings. 4
Equipped with these flexible, expedient procedural alternatives,
the state insists on according polluters the full spectrum of pro-
cedural safeguards. Coupled with the difficulties of effective en-
forcement and the lack of adequate manpower to both investigate
and prosecute violations, these procedural intricacies demonstrate
138. See N.Y. PuB. HEA.LTH LIW §§ 1225, 1250-52 (McKinney 1971).
189. Hearings on Phosphates in Detergents and the Eutrophication of America's
Waters Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 184-85 (1970).
140. N.Y. PUB. HuTnL LAW § 1210 (3) (b) (McKinney 1971).
141. Id. § 1240.
142. Id. § 1241.
143. Id. § 1243.
144. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 US. 594, 599 (1949).
145. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADNMnNznRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 709 (1958, Supp. 1970).
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that no amount of broad enabling power can compensate for the
absence of actual remedial action.
2. Air pollution control in New York-lack of enforcement.
Air pollution in New York State is governed by article 12-A of
the Public Health Law. Again there is the presence of a broad
definition of pollution subject to proscription.14 Of special
interest to current pollution concern is section 1271, which em-
powers the air pollution control board to promulgate "standards
for the composition or use of fuels or energy sources in any type
or class of air contamination .... -147 This would include motor
vehicle fuels. Subdivision (c), however, which goes on to pro-
vide for the promulgation of standards for crankcase ventilating
systems and air contaminant emission control systems1 48 has since
been expressly preempted by federal law. 49
Notwithstanding, the article has the potential, if effec-
tively enforced and developed, to abate any existing or newly
arising source of air pollution. The problem is, as with motor
vehicle fuel standards, that the board has not met the crisis that
such fuel emissions pose. The state has the authority, but has
not fulfilled its responsibility. This is due in part to the failure
of the legislature to enact self-executing measures that create
enforcement divisions comprised of inspectors and investigators.
Without these vital provisions, investigation and prosecution must
rely on the often tedious process of administrative evolution to
develop the necessary enforcement machinery. When such efforts
fail, promising pollution legislation is rendered little more than
ecological lip service.
In the final analysis, the federal laws are cumbersome and
profess to give great flexibility and deference to state and local
governments as the units with the primary responsibility in the
protection of the environment. The states have reneged on
146. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 1267 (6) (McKinney 1971). The law defines "air
contamination source" as including "any source at, from or by reason of which there is
emitted into the atmosphere any air contaminant, regardless of who the person may
be who owns or operates the building, premises or other property in, at or on which
such source is located or the facility, equipment or other property by which the emission
is caused or from which the emission comes." Id. Among other things, the terms include
"heating and power plants . .. single and multiple family residences . .. automobiles,
trucks.... buses and other motor vehicles .... Id.
147. Id. § 1271 (1) (b) (3).
148. Id. § 1271 (1) (c).
149. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857f-6a (Supp. May, 1971).
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the responsibility that the federal government says they have,
partly out of technical incompetence, callousness to local problems,
and over-compromise in favor of industrial interests. This leaves
local governments with the burden of pollution control foisted
upon their shoulders. The dilemma is compounded by the degen-
erating quality of the urban environment, which is a contributing
factor to the increasing abandonment of the central city. Conse-
quently, local governments are losing the revenues necessary to up-
grade urban life.
Municipal government, however, has the ability to meet
this challenge; indeed, it is well-suited to solve local environ-
mental problems. For example, conflicting interests among diver-
gent localities are circumvented by the needlessness of formulating
a uniform rule of law to satisfy innumerable political subdivisions.
Furthermore, because of their proximity to local feelings and
problems, local legislative bodies are better able to respond to
-local ecological crises.50 The potential problems of conflicting
policies among several localities and jurisdictional limitations can-
not be ignored, but, in a limited area, the use of municipal police
power appears to hold promise as an effective resource in the bat-
tle to preserve our environment.
V. PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO CURRENT ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
The peculiar situation in Suffolk County that gave rise to
local legislative action was a fertile basis for the passage of the
ordinance. The situation is admittedly a narrow one from which
generalizations are difficult and it therefore raises the issue of
whether the Suffolk County experience is a precedent for future
action at the municipal level or whether it is a local legislative
curiosity. Where the problem of phosphate pollution is more
generalized, and less exigent, it is less likely that the public
health and welfare would mandate a ban on the sale of detergents.
A recently released report of the International Joint Com-
mission of Canada and the United States stated that the major
factor contributing to the degradation of waters in Lakes Erie,
and Ontario is nutrients, of which phosphorous is the only one
150. See, e.g., Comment, Local Regulation of Air Pollution, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q.
232, 234-35.
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that is controllable effectively by man with present technology."'
The report found that seventy percent of the phosphorous in
sewage originates from detergents.'52 This fact alone might sanc-
tion a local law that bans the sale of detergents, where state
and federal governments fail to act. Such newly arising scientific
evidence bridges the technology gap and allows for a finding that
the sanction is reasonably designed to achieve the valid objects of
public health and welfare.
The answer to whether other current ecological threats can
be dealt with at the local level lies in a review of past and pres-
ent local legislative action. Such action demonstrates the prag-
matic application of municipal police power to abate pollution.
A. Air Pollution
There can be but little doubt that generally localities have
the requisite powers to abate air pollution when done within
the confines of due process. In Department of Health v. Ebling
Brewing Co.,' 53 the court held that conditions resulting from
the emissions of factories, buildings and houses were within the
regulatory powers of localities. Board of Health v. New York
Central R.R.5 recognized that the proscription of smoke emis-
sions was necessary and reasonable and therefore a valid exercise
of local police power.
It is apparent that local police power was utilized to deal
with traditional air contamination sources. A presently growing
source of air pollution, the effects of which have been recently
documented, is that of motor vehicle exhaust emissions. The per-
missible scope of municipal legislation in this field has been
specifically curtailed by the Air Quality Act of 1967.11 In an
151. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, PoLLu-
"TION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SEGTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE
Rrvxa 81-82 (1970).
152. Id. at 82.
153. 38 Misc. 537, 78 N.Y.S. 13 (New York Mun. Ct. 1906); accord State v. Mundet
Cork Corp., 8 N.J. 359, 86 A.2d 1, (1952); Penn-Dixie Cement Co. v. Kingsport, 189
Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270 (1949). See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1305 (1961);
Comment, Local Regulation of Air Pollution, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 232.
154. 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950); accord Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des
Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916); Ex parte Junqua, 10 Cal. App. 602, 103 P. 159 (3d Dist.
1909); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W.2d 888 (1959),
.aff'd, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
155. Pub. L. No. 90-148 § 208, 81 Stat. 501 (1967), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857
<Supp. V, 1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857f-6a (Supp. May, 1971)).
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effort to preempt the area of automobile emissions the statute
provides,
[n]o state or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject
to this subpart. No state shall require certification, inspection,
or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from
any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as a condi-
tion precedent to the initial retail sale, titling . . . or registra-
tion of such motor vehicle .... 156
Local government cannot therefore proscribe automobile pollu-
tion in terms of emissions standards, but it can act in other limited
ways. New York City has prohibited the idling of a motor vehicle
for greater than three consecutive minutes,'157 and has made it ille-
gal for a vehicle to emit visible exhaust under certain condi-
tions.'I s Such limited control, however, is not enough for effective
alleviation of this source of pollution given the ever increasing
number of vehicles in the United States.
A recent report of the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers (NIMLO)5 9 concludes that even with the preemptive
effect of the federal Air Quality Act, there is much a municipality
can do while avoiding conflicts with federal law. 60 The report
suggests that a locality may: (1) limit or ban the sale of leaded
gasoline; (2) require the city fleet and taxi fleets to run on un-
leaded fuel; (3) require the city fleet and taxi fleets to install
catalytic converters as pollution control devices as soon as pos-
sible.'("
156. Id.
157. NEiv YoRK CITY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL CODE § 1109 (1966); see ORDINANCES
o THE CITY OF BUFFALO, ch. XXV, § 134 (1969).
158. NEw YORK CITY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL CODE §§ 905 (b) & (c) (1966). It
should also be noted that on July 14, 1971, the New York City Council unanimously
approved a more stringent air pollution code. The code increases the maximum penalty
for violators to $5,000 and four months imprisonment. Twenty-five percent of the fines
go to persons giving information leading to the conviction of violators. The code also
requires industries and utilities (with the significant exception of Consolidated Edison
Company) to use fuel containing no more than three percent sulphur by October 1,
1971. Buffalo Evening News, July 14, 1971, at 16, col. 3 (city ed.). Short of an emer-
gency situation, it is doubtful at best whether similar action could be taken at the
national and state levels.
159. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, LAW AND THE MUNICIPAL
ECOLOGY, RESEARCH REPORT No. 156 (1970).
160. Id. at 19.
161. Id. at 19-22.
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Unsatisfied with federal efforts and dismayed by the success
of the automobile industry to forestall the technological innova-
tion necessary to halt automobile emissions as a major source
of air pollution, a recent piece of local legislation has done ex-
actly what the NIMLO report recommends. The law, a Buffalo,
New York city ordinance,162 calls for the phasing out of the sale
of leaded gasoline over a period of ten years 63 and mandates that
all service stations make low lead gasoline available by Septem-
ber 1, 1971.164
B. Water Pollution
A municipality may protect its water supply for the benefit
of inhabitants; such is within its police powers. 65 As with
air pollution ordinances, local water pollution laws, if not unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or capricious, and if demonstrating some reason-
able technological connection between the means utilized and the
objective sought, will be upheld."6 6 Specifically, laws have
been upheld that prevent contamination of water supplies by
animals;' that proscribe the dumping of raw sewage; 6 S and
that declare water pollution a public nuisance with the abate-
ment of its causes. 6 9 Methods used in the past to achieve abate-
ment were the prescription of water quality standards that coin-
cide with, or were more stringent than, state or federal stand-
ards;170 the promulgation of stream effluent standards;' 7' and
162. ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO art. V, ch. VII, § 89 (1970).
163. Id. §89 (3).
164. Id. § 89(1).
165. See Kelly v. New York, 6 Misc. 516, 27 N.Y.S. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1894). See
also Huber v. Blue Earth, 213 Minn. 319, 6 N.W.2d 471 (1942); Parsons v. Town of
Smithtown, 160 Misc. 103, 288 N.Y.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
166. See 7 E. MCQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.265 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1968).
167. See, e.g. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 P. 1047 (1915); Ophir v.
Ault, 67 Utah 24, 247 P. 290 (1926).
168. See, e.g., Huber v. Blue Earth, 213 Minn. 319, 6 N.W.2d 471 (1942); Parsons
v. Town of Smithtown, 160 Misc. 103, 288 N.Y.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1936). But see Old
Dominion Land Co. v. Warwick County, 172 Va. 160, 200 S.E. 619 (1939).
169. See, e.g., Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
170. See NIMLO REPORT, supra note 159, at 171. See also State v. Hatco Cheiuical
-Co., 96 N.J. Super. 238, 232 A.2d 838 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (standards stricter
than those of the state authorized for local air pollution ordinance); Village of
Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). The New York Public Health
Law authorizes municipalities to pass air pollution regulations stricter than those prom.
ulgated at the state level. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 1297 (McKinney 1971).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill.
1969); cf. Fox River Grove v. Aluminum Coil Anodizing Corp., 114 Ill. App. 2d 226,
252 N.E.2d 225 (2d Dist. 1969).
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the application of sewage effluent standards that prohibit wastes
that cannot be treated by the existing treatment processes or
that could damage the treatment facilities.172 Also, a municipality
may enforce the remedies existing under state pollution laws as is
provided under New York law.17 3
As opposed to the area of air pollution, recent federal legis-
lation does not purport to preempt state and local efforts to
meet current water pollution problems; rather, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act specifically declares it to be the fed-
eral government's policy to "recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing
and controlling water pollution .... ,, 74With this broad leeway
announced by the federal government, and the presence of en-
abling authority from the state, a municipality's only major short-
coming in water pollution control may be that of local juris-
dictional conflicts; that is, the exercise of local police power is
generally limited to within the corporate boundaries.' 5 Where
the source of the pollutant is outside the municipality, absent
a statute enabling a locality to protect its waters from contamina-
tion sources in other localities, 7 6 the municipality is generally
powerless to act on its own.
Within the confines of local authority, however, recent'local
legislation demonstrates the efficacy of local police power in
water pollution control. While the phosphate problem has not
been effectively dealt with at the federal and, in many instances,
at the state level, quite the contrary is true at the local levels.
Aside from the Suffolk County experience, the city of Chicago,
Illinois has amended chapter 17 of its municipal code 77 to con-
172. See, e.g., NIMLO REPORT, supra note 159, at 173-74.
173. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1255 (McKinney 1971).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 466 (b) (Supp. V, 1970).
175. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal. 2d 639, 67 P.2d 344 (1937). See
generally 5 E. MCQUILLAN, MuNICIPAL CORa'ORATIONS § 15.30 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1969).
176. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 69 Wash. 2d 148, 417 P.2d
632 (1966). But see City of Poughkeepsie v. Vassar College, 35 Misc. 2d 604, 606, 232
N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (Sup. Ct. 1961), where the court said that "[ain exception arises in
the instance of a municipal water supply; then the municipality may exercise its power
extra-territorially to protect the purity of the water .... ." See also 7 E. MCQUILLAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.200 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1968).
177. CHICAGO, ILL., MrN. CoDE art. VII, §§ 17-7.1 through 17-7.4 (1970). Erie
County, New York, has also passed a local law banning the sale and distribution of
synthetic detergents with more than 8.7% phosphorus as of May 11, 1971. The law
mandates that all phosphate detergents be banned by January 1, 1972. Excepted from
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trol the sale of phosphate detergents. The law provides that all
detergents must be labeled with their respective phosphate con-
tents by February 1, 1971.178 The law also makes it illegal to sell
or otherwise furnish any detergents containing more than 8.7%
phosphate within the city of Chicago after that same date."0 Per-
sons violating the law are subject to up to a five hundred dollar
fine and six months imprisonment.180 What is particularly signifi-
cant about the Chicago law is that it is premised not on the exi-
gent circumstances as existed in Suffolk County, but was based on
the general detrimental effects of such substances as announced
by the International Joint Commission.""
Akron, Ohio passed an ordinance largely similar to that en-
acted in Chicago.18 2 The Akron experience has an additional
teaching, however. It was reported that the City Council of Akron
is considering the repeal of its new ordinance in return for a
firm promise by detergent manufacturers to abide by set stand-
ards .1 3 These events counsel that: local efforts can succeed in pro-
ducing needed legislation where state and federal governments
will not act; and municipalities are comparatively bolder and in a
better bargaining position with (and better able to put pressure
on) large firms-an interesting paradox.
C. Solid Waste Problems
Municipalities have the ability to remove and direct the
manner of disposal of solid wastes that pose a threatening re-
lationship to the health and safety of the community.' 4 It has
the proscription are phosphate detergents designed for the following: machine dish-
washers; dairy equipment; beverage equipment; food processing equipment; and indus-
trial cleaning equipment. SANITARY CODE OF EaIE COUNTY, N.Y. art. IV, §§ 7-10 (1971).
178. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE art. VII, § 17-7.2.
179. Id. § 17-7.3.
180. Id. § 17-7.4.
181. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIssSION OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, POLLU-
TION OF LAmx ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE
RIVER 81-82 (1970).
182. AKRON, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 753 (1970) .
183. Buffalo Evening News, May 25, 1971, at 28, col. 5 (city ed.) .
184. See, e.g., Silver v. Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 2d 134, 31 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Strub v. Deerfield, 19 Ill. 2d 401, 167 N.E.2d 178 (1960); Medford v.
C. & H. Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946); Grand Rapids v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688,
151 N.W. 672 (1915); Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309, 105 N.E. 548 (1914); Meyers
v. Cornwall. 24 Misc. 2d 286, 192 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1965); V. & H. Equipment Rental
Corp. v. Garfield Heights, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 605, 161 N.E.2d 646 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1959) ; Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959).
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been held that solid waste disposal is an affirmative duty imposed
upon the municipality.:85
At the federal level, the area of solid wastes is the subject
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 196518' and the Resource
Recovery Act of 1970.187 The first of these laws does little
more than authorize studies in waste disposal programs'88 and
make funds available for up to two-thirds of the cost of any
local facility. 8 9 The act also sets up a number of experimental
pilot projects. 90 The 1970 act emphasizes waste prevention and
recycling with attempts at direct federal-local cooperative efforts. 19'
Unfortunately, because of a professed lack of technological de-
velopment, 9 2 neither law sets any present standards nor proscribes
any ecologically damaging products.
The city of South San Francisco, California was not satis-
fied with these federal efforts, and faced with a growing solid
waste disposal problem, promulgated a law that banned the sale
of soft drinks in nonreturnable glass bottles and cans. 9 3 For a
violation of its terms the ordinance provided for up to a $100
fine9" and as much as 30 days imprisonment 95 Although the
local law has reportedly been recently repealed'98 in favor of a
solid waste recycling program, the episode is significant in at
least two respects. It demonstrates that a locality is better able
to experiment with trial and error techniques when the higher
echelons of government are stymied. In this case the local govern-
ment through experimentation was able to determine what means
best suited the peculiar local circumstances. Also, the municipal-
ity was able to act swiftly to first enact a stopgap measure to meet
local exigencies, and secondly to correct what was later determined
185. Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309, 105 N.E. 548 (1914).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59 (Supp. V, 1970).
187. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 3251 et seq.
(Supp. May, 1970).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 3253 (Supp. V, 1970).
189. Id. § 3253 (d).
190. Id. § 3253.
191. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 3251 et
seq. (Supp. May, 1970).
192. See Schroeder, Pollution in Perspective: A Survey of the Federal Effort and
the Case Approach, 4 NATuRAL R.souRacs LAw. 381, 422-23 (1971).
193. South San Francisco, Calif., Ordinance No. 611 (1971).
194. Id. § IV.
195. Id.
196. Buffalo Evening News, Aug. 4, 1971, at 13, col. 1 (city ed.).
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to be an error in legislative judgment. This exercise in legislative
flexibility is something federal and state governments would not
be equipped to do for innumerable, diverse local problems.
D. Enforcement of Local Pollution Laws
The most vital area of pollution control is that of enforce-
ment; for without diligent prosecution of violators, even the most
revolutionary environmental reform statutes and ordinaces be-
come mere hollow legislative gestures. It has been suggested that
locally enforceable pollution laws may have a distinct advantage
over their federal and state counterparts.9 7 Local police depart-
ments could equip their patrol cars with such devices as Ringel-
mann Charts198 and have officers issue summonses to violators of
air pollution ordinances. Police could also report violations to a
central dispatcher who could then route an inspector to the
scene. 9 9 For example, in Chicago, Illinois, air pollution control
inspectors patrol the city by day in radio-equipped vehicles,
citing violations of the pollution ordinances.2 0 To encourage
voluntary adherence, a New York City law authorizes local offi-
cials to summarily seal noncomplying refuse burning equip-
ment.201
Authorized by a local ordinance or state statute, municipal
enforcement of pollution laws therefore has a distinct advantage-
less administrative procedures to wade through to achieve ulti-
mate compliance. Also, lack of funding need not be a determin-
ative obstacle where imaginative use is made of an existing police
force. However, while municipalities may be a bastion of un-
tapped legal muscle in the battle to save the environment, how
are the courts receiving these current local efforts?
197. NIMLO REPORT, supra note 159, at 14-15.
198. For a case upholding and explaining the use of Ringelmann Charts see City
of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 233 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
199. NIMLO REPORT at 15-16.
200. Id. at 14.
201. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup.
Ct. 1969), modified and aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 811, 311 N.Y.S.2d 635 (2d Dep't),
afl'd, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 265 N.E.2d 72, 316 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S.
986 (1971).
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VI. AN ENLIGHTENED CONCEPTION OF THE MUNICIPALITY'S ROLE
Pursuant to chapter 41 of the New York City Administrative
Code, incinerators in multiple dwellings were required to be
upgraded to improve the combusting of refuse through the instal-
lation of a water scrubbing device that would eliminate soot,
fly ash and dirt from emissions.2 02 A subsequent amendment
to the law in 1968 mandated the procurement of an operating
certificate as a prerequisite for incineration; and various dead-
lines were promulgated for compliance.0 3 The local law pro-
vided that the commissioner could summarily seal nonconforming
equipment.0 4 In response to the law, various property owners
and the Real Estate Board of New York brought suit in New York
State Supreme Court, Kings County, to have the law declared
unconstitutional and to enjoin defendants from entering plain-
tiffs' buildings and sealing their refuse burning equipment.20
In granting the Commissioner of Sanitation's cross motion for
summary judgment declaring the law constitutional, the court
held that there was no probative merit to the argument that pri-
vately owned multiple dwellings are responsible for less than one
percent of the total emissions from all sources; the rationale be-
ing, an amelioration of a condition adversely affecting the public
health, however minimal in effect, satisfies the constitutional
requirement that the law be reasonably related to some manifest
evil.20 The court went on to dismiss the objections that: the law
provides a mere piecemeal approach to the air pollution prob-
lem;20 T compliance with the law imposed a heavy economic bur-
den: 2" and summary sealing of incinerators is a violation of due
202. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920-22, 297 N.Y.S2d 481, 435
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
203. Id. at 923, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 436-37.
204. Id. at 924, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
205. Id. at 921-22, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
206. Id. at 926, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 439. See Barber's Supermarket, Inc. v. Grants, 80
N.M. 533, 458 P.2d 785 (1969), holding that an incinerator contributes to air pollution,
and it is not necessary that it contribute to the extent of becoming a nuisance before a
city may prohibit its use.
207. 58 Misc. 2d at 926, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
208. Id. at 928-29, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42. See Suttner v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834,
384 P.2d 859 (1963), holding that the harsh economic effect of a smoke abatement ordi-
nance cannot invalidate it unless shown to be clearly unreasonable and discriminatory.
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process. 0 9 On appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, the court held that the presumption favoring the consti-
tutionality of municipal enactments had not been rebutted by the
plaintiffs and no trial on that issue was required.210 On fur-
ther appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court unanimously
affirmed the decision of the supreme court stating that there
was no merit to the argument posed by the appellants that
the city in a panic has adopted measures which will not achieve
what is hoped or, if so, at a greater cost than is necessary....
The rebuttal is that such arguments, however cogent they may
appear to be, do not affect the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Efforts at solution of serious problems will not wait on perfect
knowledge or the application of optimal methods of alleviation
to the exclusion of trial and error experimentation. Unfortunately,
the extent of the pollution problem, its life-threatening accelera-
tion, and the high economic and social costs of control are ex-
ceeded -in gravity by only one or two domestic or even interna-
tional issues.211
Significantly, the court went on to hold that the according of a
hearing to aggrieved persons after summary sealing of equipment
complied with due process. 212
The court's discussion in the above case captures the very
essence of the role of municipal police power in a system in which
the upper levels of the governmental bureaucratic hierarchy have
become too rigid and nearsighted to effectively solve the ever in-
creasing environmental problems of a multiplicity of local units.
Implicitly, the court recognizes the necessity for municipal action
and its ability to act in situations not conducive to the com-
promise that attends higher levels of government decision making.
The opinion exemplifies the principle of flexibility that is, and
should be, accorded to localities to eradicate their particular
ecological difficulties. In doing so, the court impliedly takes the
view that the present environmental concern is a policy choice bet-
ter made, in some cases, to conform to local requirements and de-
209. 58 Misc. 2d at 930, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43. See Fox River Grove v. Aluminum
Coil Anodizing Corp., 114 IlL. App. 2d 226, 252 N.E.2d 225 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1969),
holding, inter alia, that it is not necessary that a water pollution ordinance provide
for notice and an opportunity to correct violations before prosecution.
210. 34 App. Div. 2d at 812, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
211. 27 N.Y.2d at 219, 265 N.E.2d at 75, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
212. Id. at 221-22, 265 N.E.2d at 76, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 232. See generally 1 K. DAvIs,
AD.mNiSiATivE LAiw TREnArSa § 7.08 (1958, Supp. 1970).
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sires. Conceiving this decision as one adding further impetus and
enabling power to municipalities, it is apparent that, at least in
New York State, greater involvement by local government in con-
temporary ecological problems can be expected.
VII. CONCLUSION
Endowed with a pervasive power to rectify social problems,
the response of Congress to the public sense of national priorities
with respect to pollution has been subordinated to short-run in-
terests, resulting in a series of incremental adjustments as op-
posed to the needed wide range policy decisions that must be made
if the environment is to be preserved.21 3 It has been suggested
that to a large measure the problem is the structure of the com-
mittee system and its fragmented approach to the environment.214
A single unified bill must usually be referred to several com-
mittees, each determining for themselves what the policy should
be. The system, dominated by a few powerful committee chair-
men, favors economic interests while ignoring the public outcry
for reform. Congress also lacks the technological expertise
to make a studied decision without the predominate counsel of
the very same interests they are obliged to regulate. 5 Con-
squently, to move Congress to swift action, nothing short of a
national ecological disaster will do.
To compensate for this and similar inaction at the state level,
municipal police power is not being advocated as a substitute for
federal and state legislation and enforcement; but where these
higher levels of government demonstrate the inability to act, mu-
nicipal police power can be an effective alternative until a uniform
and coordinated policy is formulated.
If local police power can be upheld as legitimate to combat
phosphate pollution where the technological connection between
the reasonableness of the prohibition and some valid local
objective is not yet fully developed, a fortiori, the exercise must
be sustained in the area of air pollution by motor vehicles where
the evidence of a detriment to the public is more firmly estab-
213. See Cooley & Wandesforde-Smith, Conclusions: Congress and the Environment
of the Future, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 229-30 (R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-
Smith eds. 1970).
214. Id. at 227.
215. Id. at 229-30.
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lished. Similarly, solid waste problems are more clearly visible
and seem to pose less of a causal relationship problem. If muni-
cipal police power is to realize its objective of the protection of
the health, safety and welfare of local inhabitants, newly arising
ecological problems must fall within its circumscription. While
waiting for Congress and the state legislatures to act, muni-
cipal police power has great pragmatic utility.
WARREN B. ROSENBAUM
NEGATIVE LEASEHOLDS: THE PROPERTY-CONTRACT DISTINCTION
AND A FAILURE OF JUST COMPENSATION
In recent years, eminent domain has been utilized and ex-
panded to satisfy certain material needs of the public sector.'
Public authorities clearly possess the power to acquire private
property for public purposes.2 However, the continued existence
and ultimate success of programs entailing land acquisition de-
pends on (1) the receptiveness of courts to public takings; (2)
legislative authorization and appropriation; and (3) an absence
of public indignation over the disruptions to private expectations
inherent in public takings of private property.8 Public indigna-
tion can be neutralized best by a system which provides just com-
pensation for takings of private property.4 This comment will
explain and evaluate one instance where there is a failure of
just compensation. The situation arises when property encum-
bered with a leasehold is condemned and taken in a falling real
1. For an analysis of the historical development of eminent domain, see
Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954).
2. Under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, no govern-
mental authority can seize private property without payment of just compensation.
By force of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, this requirement
is extended to the states and their subdivisions. See Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385
(N.D. Ohio 1888). Notwithstanding, N.Y. CoNr. art. 1, § 7 (a) provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." See Sackman,
The Right to Condemn, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 177, 180-83 (1965).
3. See Baker, Condemnation: Concepts and Consequences of Public Intervention
in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 KAN. L. REV. 399, 400 (1961).
4. This is closely aligned to the idea of indemnification for public takings. See
Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REv. 477, 535 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Polasky].
